New research into Classical Greek Period revisions by Xenophon would mean
that the lives of Aristotle and Socrates overlapped by about 18 years,
Socrates dying in 366 BCE. The similiarties between Socrates' boy-lover
and Aristotle become very apparent: Both were orphaned around 10 years of
age, fostered by a philosopher and at around 18 became a charge of Plato.
Both were said to be quite handsome. When the possibility that Aristotle
thus not only knew Socrates but was actually his boy-lover "Phaedo", the
following 80 quotes were extracted from the works of Aristotle, some of
them
actually quoting Socrates quite authoritatively, consistent with him
knowing
him. It also becomes apparent that Aristotle was a huge admirer of
Socrates. Here are the 80 quotes for future reference:
-------------------
TOTAL 80 REFERENCES
5 from Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics
Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics book 1, section 1216b
Accordingly [b]Socrates[/b] the senior thought that the End is to get to
know virtue, and he pursued an inquiry into the nature of justice and
courage and each of the divisions of virtue. (1.29)
Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics book 3, section 1229a
Second is military courage; this is due to experience and to knowledge,
not
of what is formidable, as [b]Socrates[/b] said, but of ways of
encountering
what is formidable. (1.86)
Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics book 3, section 1230a
For the fact is the exact opposite of the view of [b]Socrates[/b], who
thought that bravery was knowledge: sailors who know how to go aloft are
not
daring through knowing what things are formidable, but because they know
how
to protect themselves against the dangers; also courage is not merely what
makes men more daring fighters, for in that case strength and wealth would
be courage-as Theognis puts it:
For every man by poverty subdued.
(1.63)
Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics book 7, section 1235a
Others hold that only what is useful is a friend, the proof being that all
men actually do pursue the useful, and discard what is useless even in
their
own persons (as the old [b]Socrates[/b] used to say, instancing spittle,
hair and nails), and that we throw away even parts of the body that are of
no use, and finally the body itself, when it dies, as a corpse is
useless-but people that have a use for it keep it, as in Egypt. (2.74)
Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics book 8, section 1247b
Therefore this will not be a matter of fortune; but when the same result
follows from indeterminate and in definite antecedents, it will be good or
bad for somebody, but there will not be the knowledge of it that comes by
experience, since, if there were, some fortunate persons would learn it,
or
indeed all branches of knowledge would, as [b]Socrates[/b] said, be forms
of
good fortune. (1.67)
31 from Aristotle, Metaphysics
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 1, section 981a
To have a judgement that when Callias was suffering from this or that
disease this or that benefited him, and similarly with [b]Socrates[/b] and
various other individuals, is a matter of experience; but to judge that it
benefits all persons of a certain type, considered as a class, who suffer
from this or that disease (e.g. the phlegmatic or bilious when suffering
from burning fever) is a matter of art. (1.67)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 1, section 981a
For it is not man that the physician cures, except incidentally, but
Callias
or [b]Socrates[/b] or some other person similarly named, who is
incidentally
a man as well. (1.81)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 1, section 983b
Similarly we do not say that [b]Socrates[/b] comes into being absolutely
when he becomes handsome or cultured, nor that he is destroyed when he
loses
these qualities; because the substrate, [b]Socrates[/b] himself, persists.
(3.30)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 1, section 987b
And when [b]Socrates[/b], disregarding the physical universe and confining
his study to moral questions, sought in this sphere for the universal and
was the first to concentrate upon definition, Plato followed him and
assumed
that the problem of definition is concerned not with any sensible thing
but
with entities of another kind; for the reason that there can be no general
definition of sensible things which are always changing. (1.36)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 1, section 991a
To say that the Forms are patterns, and that other things participate in
them, is to use empty phrases and poetical metaphors; for what is it that
fa****ons things on the model of the Ideas Besides, anything may both be
and
become like something else without being imitated from it; thus a man may
become just like [b]Socrates[/b] whether [b]Socrates[/b] exists or not,and
even if [b]Socrates[/b] were eternal, clearly the case would be the same.
(2.72)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 1, section 991b
Is it because things are other numbers, e.g. such and such a number Man,
such and such another [b]Socrates[/b], such and such another Callias?
(3.46)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 3, section 1003a
But if the common predicate be hypostatized as an individual thing,
[b]Socrates[/b] will be several beings: himself, and Man, and Animal-that
is, if each predicate denotes one particular thing. (2.96)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 4, section 1004b
If this is not so, who is it who in will investigate whether
"[b]Socrates[/b] " and "[b]Socrates[/b] seated" are the same thing; or
whether one thing has one contrary, or what the contrary is, or how many
meanings it has? (7.20)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 4, section 1007b
But it is not in this sense-that both terms are accidents of something
else-that [b]Socrates[/b] is cultured. (1.10)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 4, section 1007b
Therefore since some accidents are predicated in the latter and some in
the
former sense, such as are predicated in the way that "white" is of
[b]Socrates[/b] cannot be an infinite series in the upper direction; e.g.
there cannot be another accident of "white [b]Socrates[/b]," for the sum
of
these predications does not make a single statement. (1.68)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 4, section 1007b
Nor can "white " have a further accident, such as "cultured"; for the
former
is no more an accident of the latter than vice versa; and besides we have
distinguished that although some predicates are accidental in this sense,
others are accidental in the sense that "cultured" is to [b]Socrates[/b];
and whereas in the former case the accident is an accident of an accident,
it is not so in the latter; and thus not all predications will be of
accidents. (2.96)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 5, section 1017a
Similarly too in affirmation and negation; e.g., in "[b]Socrates[/b] is
cultured" "is" means that this is true; or in "[b]Socrates[/b] is
not-white"
that this is true; but in "the diagonal is not commensurable""is not"
means
that the statement is false. (3.86)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 5, section 1018a
"[b]Socrates[/b]" and "cultured [b]Socrates[/b]" seem to be the same; but
"[b]Socrates[/b]" is not a class-name, and hence we do not say "every
[b]Socrates[/b]" as we say "every man. (5.20)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 5, section 1024b
Now in one sense there is only one definition of each thing, namely that
of
its essence; but in another sense there are many definitions, since the
thing itself, and the thing itself qualified (e.g. "[b]Socrates[/b]" and
"cultured [b]Socrates[/b]") are in a sense the same. (4.75)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1032a
It is obvious that the sophistical objections to this thesis are met in
the
same way as the question whether [b]Socrates[/b] is the same as the
essence
of [b]Socrates[/b]; for there is no difference either in the grounds for
asking the question or in the means of meeting it successfully. (4.51)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1033b
The whole individual, Callias or [b]Socrates[/b], corresponds to "this
bronze sphere," but "man" and "animal" correspond to bronze sphere in
general. (1.33)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1034a
The completed whole, such-and-such a form induced in this flesh and these
bones, is Callias or [b]Socrates[/b]. (1.91)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1035b
But individually [b]Socrates[/b] is already composed of ultimate matter;
and
similarly in all other cases. (1.81)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1036b
And the analogy in the case of the living thing which the younger
[b]Socrates[/b] used to state is not a good one; for it leads one away
from
the truth, and makes one suppose that it is possible for a man to exist
without his parts, as a circle does without the bronze. (1.43)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1037a
And "[b]Socrates[/b]" or "Coriscus" has a double sense, that is if the
soul
too can be called [b]Socrates[/b] (for by [b]Socrates[/b] some mean the
soul
and some the concrete person); but if [b]Socrates[/b] means simply this
soul
and this body, the individual is composed similarly to the universal.
(6.91)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1037b
But such things as are material or are compounded with matter are not the
same as their essence; not even if they are accidentally one, e.g.
[b]Socrates[/b] and "cultured"; for these are only accidentally the same.
(1.76)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1038b
Again, a substance will be present in "[b]Socrates[/b]," who is a
substance;
so that it will be the substance of two things. (1.10)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1040a
The formula, then, is general; but the sun was supposed to be an
individual,
like Cleon or [b]Socrates[/b]. (2.41)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 10, section 1055b
For if we always use the word "whether" in an antithesis-e.g., "whether it
is white or black," or "whether it is white or not" (but we do not ask
"whether it is a man or white," unless we are proceeding upon some
assumption, and asking, for instance, whether it was Cleon who came or
[b]Socrates[/b]. (1.51)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 12, section 1070a
There are three kinds of substance: (1.) matter, which exists individually
in virtue of being apparent(for everything which is characterized by
contact
and so not by coalescence is matter and substrate; e.g. fire, flesh and
head;these are all matter, and the last is the matter of a substance in
the
strictest sense); (2.) the "nature"(existing individually)-i.e. a kind of
positive state which is the terminus of motion; and (3.) the particular
combination of these, e.g. [b]Socrates[/b] or Callias. (1.02)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 12, section 1074a
But all things which are many in number have matter (for one and the same
definition applies to many individuals, e.g. that of "man"; but
[b]Socrates[/b] is one), but the primary essence has no matter, because it
is complete reality. (1.76)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 13, section 1078b
Now [b]Socrates[/b] devoted his attention to the moral virtues, and was
the
first to seek a general definition of these(for of the Physicists
Democritus
gained only a superficial grasp of the subject and defined, after a
fa****on,
"the hot" and "the cold"; while the Pythagoreans at an earlier date had
arrived at definitions of some few things-whose formulae they connected
with
numbers-e.g., what "op****tunity" is, or "justice" or "marriage"); and he
naturally inquired into the essence of things;for he was trying to reason
logically, and the starting-point of all logical reasoning is the essence.
(1.51)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 13, section 1078b
There are two innovations which, may fairly be ascribed to
[b]Socrates[/b]:
inductive reasoning and general definition. (2.74)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 13, section 1078b
But whereas [b]Socrates[/b] regarded neither universals nor definitions as
existing in separation, the Idealists gave them a separate existence, and
to
these universals and definitions of existing things they gave the name of
Ideas. (1.29)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 13, section 1079b
Besides, anything may both be and come to be without being imitated from
something else; thus a man may become like [b]Socrates[/b] whether
[b]Socrates[/b] exists or not,and even if [b]Socrates[/b] were eternal,
clearly the case would be the same. (4.56)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 13, section 1086b
This theory, as we have said in an earlier passage, was initiated by
[b]Socrates[/b] as a result of his definitions, but he did not separate
universals from particulars; and he was right in not separating them.
(1.67)
7 from Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) bekker page 1116b, bekker
line 1
(2) Again, experience of some particular form of danger is taken for a
sort
of Courage; hence arose [b]Socrates[/b]' notion that Courage is Knowledge.
(2.41)
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) bekker page 1127b, bekker
line 20
These also mostly disown qualities held in high esteem, as [b]Socrates[/b]
used to do. (1.16)
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) bekker page 1144b, bekker
line 1
Hence some people maintain that all the virtues are forms of Prudence; and
[b]Socrates[/b]' line of enquiry was right in one way though wrong in
another; he was mistaken in thinking thatall the virtues are forms of
Prudence, but right in saying that they cannot exist without Prudence.
(1.19)
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) bekker page 1144b, bekker
line 20
[b]Socrates[/b] then thought that the virtues are principles, for he said
that they are all of them forms of knowledge. (2.81)
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) bekker page 1145b, bekker
line 20
Some people say that he cannot do so when he knows the act to be wrong;
since, as [b]Socrates[/b] held, it would be strange if, when a man
possessed
Knowledge, some other thing should overpower it, and 'drag it about like a
slave. (1.51)
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) bekker page 1145b, bekker
line 20
In fact [b]Socrates[/b] used to combat the view altogether, implying that
there is no such thing as Unrestraint, since no one, he held, acts
contrary
to what is best, believing what he does to be bad, but only through
ignorance. (2.06)
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) bekker page 1147b, bekker
line 1
But inasmuch as the last premise, which originates action, is an opinion
as
to some object of sense, and it is this opinion which the unrestrained man
when under the influence of passion either does not possess, or only
possesses in a way which as we saw does not amount to knowing it but only
makes him repeat it as the drunken man repeats the maxims of Empedocles,
and
since the ultimate term is not a universal, and is not deemed to be an
object of Scientific Knowledge in the same way as a universal term is, we
do
seem to be led to the conclusion which [b]Socrates[/b] sought to
establish.
(1.36)
25 from Aristotle, Politics
Aristotle, Politics book 1, section 1260a
Hence it is manifest that all the persons mentioned have a moral virtue of
their own, and that the temperance of a woman and that of a man are not
the
same, nor their courage and justice, as [b]Socrates[/b] thought, but the
one
is the courage of command, and the other that of subordination, and the
case
is similar with the other virtues. (1.08)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1261a
For example, it is possible for the citizens to have children, wives and
possessions in common with each other, as in Plato's Republic, in which
[b]Socrates[/b] says that there must be community of children, women and
possessions. (2.06)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1261a
Now for all the citizens to have their wives in common involves a variety
of
difficulties; in particular, (1) the object which [b]Socrates[/b] advances
as the reason why this enactment should be made clearly does not follow
from
his arguments; also (2) as a means to the end which he asserts should be
the
fundamental object of the city, the scheme as actually set forth in the
dialogue is not practicable; yet (3) how it is to be further worked out
has
been nowhere definitely stated. (1.96)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1261a
I refer to the ideal of the fullest possible unity of the entire state,
which [b]Socrates[/b] takes as his fundamental principle. (0.85)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1261b
Again, even granting that it is best for the community to be as complete a
unity as possible, complete unity does not seem to be proved by the
formula
'if all the citizens say "Mine" and "Not mine" at the same time,' which
[b]Socrates[/b] thinks to be a sign of thecity's being completely one.
(3.46)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1261b
If it means 'each severally,' very likely this would more fully realize
the
state of things which [b]Socrates[/b] wishes to produce (for in that case
every citizen will call the same boy his son and also the same woman his
wife, and will speak in the same way of property and indeed of each of the
accessories of life) but ex hypothesi the citizens, having community of
women and children, will not call them 'theirs' in this sense, but will
mean
theirs collectively and not severally, and similarly they will call
property
'theirs' meaning the property of them all, not of each of them severally.
(1.19)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1262b
But speaking generally such a law is bound to bring about the opposite
state
of things to that which rightly enacted laws ought properly to cause, and
because of which [b]Socrates[/b] thinks it necessary to make these
regulations about the children and women. (1.10)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1262b
For we think that friend****p is the greatest of blessings for the state,
since it is the best safeguard against revolution, and the unity of the
state, which [b]Socrates[/b] praises most highly, both appears to be and
is
said by him to be the effect of friend****p, just as we know that
Aristophanes in the discourses on love describes how the lovers owing to
their extreme affection desire to grow together and both become one
instead
of being two. (1.51)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1263b
The cause of [b]Socrates[/b]' error must be deemed to be that his
fundamental assumption was incorrect. (2.29)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264a
Moreover, the working of the constitution as a whole in regard to the
members of the state has also not been described by [b]Socrates[/b], nor
is
it easy to say what it will be. (1.36)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264a
For [b]Socrates[/b] makes the Guardians a sort of garrison, while the
Farmers, Artisans and other cl***** are the citizens. (1.91)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264a
But quarrels and lawsuits and all the other evils which according to
[b]Socrates[/b] exist in actual states will all be found among his
citizens
too. (1.55)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264b
But again, if [b]Socrates[/b] intends to make the Farmers have their wives
in common but their property private, who is to manage the household in
the
way in which the women's husbands will carry on the work of the farms?
(2.96)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264b
It is also strange that [b]Socrates[/b] employs the comparison of the
lower
animals to show that the women are to have the same occupations as the
men,
considering that animals have no households to manage. (2.47)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264b
Also [b]Socrates[/b]' method of appointing the magistrates is not a safe
one. (1.81)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264b
But it is clear that he is compelled to make the same persons govern
always,
for the god-given admixture of gold in the soul is not bestowed on some at
one time and others at another time, but is always in the same men, and
[b]Socrates[/b] says that at the moment of birth some men receive an
admixture of gold and others of silver and those who are to be the
Artisans
and Farmers an admixture of copper and iron. (1.96)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264b
The Republic discussed by [b]Socrates[/b] therefore possesses these
difficulties and also others not smaller than these. (1.96)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264b
For in the Republic [b]Socrates[/b] has laid down details about very few
matters-regulations about community of wives and children and about
property, and the structure of the constitution (for the mass of the
population is divided into two parts, one forming the Farmer class and the
other the class that defends the state in war, and there is a third class
drawn from these latter that forms the council and governs the state), but
about the Farmers and the Artisans, whether they are excluded from
government or have some part in it, and whether these cl***** also are to
possess arms and to serve in war with the others or not, on these points
[b]Socrates[/b] has made no decision, but though he thinks that the women
ought to serve in war with the Guardians and share the same education, the
rest of the discourse he has filled up with external topics, and about the
sort of education which it is proper for the Guardians to have. (2.98)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1265a
Now it is true that all the discourses of [b]Socrates[/b] possess
brilliance, cleverness, originality and keenness of inquiry, but it is no
doubt difficult to be right about everything: for instance with regard to
the size of population just mentioned it must not be over-looked that a
territory as large as that of Babylon will be needed for so many
inhabitants, or some other country of unlimited extent, to sup****t five
thousand men in idleness and another swarm of women and servants around
them
many times as numerous. (2.29)
Aristotle, Politics book 4, section 1291a
For [b]Socrates[/b] says that the most necessary elements of which a state
is composed are four, and he specifies these as a weaver, a farmer, a
shoemaker and a builder; and then again he adds, on the ground that these
are not self-sufficient, a copper-smith and the people to look after the
necessary live-stock, and in addition a merchant and a retail trader.
(1.10)
Aristotle, Politics book 5, section 1316a
The subject of revolutions is discussed by [b]Socrates[/b] in the
Republic,
but is not discussed well. (2.54)
Aristotle, Politics book 5, section 1316a
He says that the cause is that nothing is permanent but everything changes
in a certain cycle, and that change has its origin in those numbers 'whose
basic ratio 4 : 3 linked with the number 5 gives two harmonies,'-meaning
whenever the number of this figure becomes cubed,-in the belief that
nature
sometimes engenders men that are evil, and too strong for education to
influence-speaking perhaps not ill as far as this particular dictum goes
(for it is possible that there are some persons incapable of being
educated
and becoming men of noble character), but why should this process of
revolution belong to the constitution which [b]Socrates[/b] speaks of as
the
best, more than to all the other forms of constitution, and to all men
that
come into existence? (1.70)
Aristotle, Politics book 5, section 1316b
And although there are several forms of oligarchy and of democracy,
[b]Socrates[/b] speaks of the revolutions that occur in them as though
there
were only one form of each. (1.29)
Aristotle, Politics book 8, section 1342a
[b]Socrates[/b] in the Republic does not do well in allowing only the
Phrygian mode along with the Dorian, and that when he has rejected the
flute
among instruments; for the Phrygian mode has the same effect among
harmonies
as the flute among instruments-both are violently exciting and emotional.
(0.75)
Aristotle, Politics
Therefore some musical experts also rightly criticize [b]Socrates[/b]
because he disapproved of the relaxed harmonies for amusement, taking them
to have the character of intoxication, not in the sense of the effect of
strong drink, for that clearly has more the result of making men frenzied
revellers, but as failing in power. (1.10)
12 from Aristotle, Rhetoric
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1356b
Now, that which is persuasive is persuasive in reference to some one, and
is
persuasive and convincing either at once and in and by itself, or because
it
appears to be proved by propositions that are convincing; further, no art
has the particular in view, medicine for instance what is good for
[b]Socrates[/b] or Callias, but what is good for this or that class of
persons (for this is a matter that comes within the province of an art,
whereas the particular is infinite and cannot be the subject of a true
science); similarly, therefore, Rhetoric will not consider what seems
probable in each individual case, for instance to [b]Socrates[/b] or
Hippias, but that which seems probable to this or that class of persons.
(2.55)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1357b
Among signs, some are related as the particular to the universal; for
instance, if one were to say that all wise men are just, because
[b]Socrates[/b] was both wise and just. (1.96)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1367b
We ought also to consider in whose presence we praise, for, as
[b]Socrates[/b] said, it is not difficult to praise Athenians among
Athenians. (2.06)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1382a
Anger has always an individual as its object, for instance Callias or
[b]Socrates[/b], whereas hatred applies to cl*****; for instance, every
one
hates a thief or informer. (1.51)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1390b
Highly gifted families often degenerate into maniacs, as, for example, the
descendants of Alcibiades and the elder Dionysius; those that are stable
into fools and dullards, like the descendants of Cimon, Pericles, and
[b]Socrates[/b]. (3.04)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1393b
Comparison is illustrated by the sayings of [b]Socrates[/b]; for instance,
if one were to say that magistrates should not be chosen by lot, for this
would be the same as choosing as representative athletes not those
competent
to contend, but those on whom the lot falls; or as choosing any of the
sailors as the man who should take the helm, as if it were right that the
choice should be decided by lot, not by a man's knowledge. (1.91)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1398a
Also, the reason why [b]Socrates[/b] refused to visit Archelaus, declaring
that it was disgraceful not to be in a position to return a favor as well
as
an injury. (2.23)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1398b
Or as Aristippus, when in his opinion Plato had expressed himself too
presumptuously, said, "Our friend at any rate never spoke like that,"
referring to [b]Socrates[/b]. (1.47)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1399a
There is an instance of this in the [b]Socrates[/b] of Theodectes: "What
holy place has he profaned? (2.89)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1415b
For [b]Socrates[/b] says truly in his Funeral Oration that "it is easy to
praise Athenians in the presence of Athenians, but not in the presence of
Lacedaemonians. (1.91)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1419a
For instance, [b]Socrates[/b], when accused by Meletus of not believing in
the gods, asked whether he did not say that there was a divine something;
and when Meletus said yes, [b]Socrates[/b] went on to ask if divine beings
were not either children of the gods or something godlike. (3.14)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1419a
When Meletus again said yes, [b]Socrates[/b] rejoined, "Is there a man,
then, who can admit that the children of the gods exist without at the
same
time admitting that the gods exist? (2.01)
END
Lars Wilson
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