On Feb 6, 12:10=A0pm, "Lars Wilson" <siaxa...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> New research into Classical Greek Period revisions by Xenophon would
mean
> that the lives of Aristotle and Socrates overlapped by about 18 years,
> Socrates dying in 366 BCE. =A0 The similiarties between Socrates'
boy-love=
r
> and Aristotle become very apparent: =A0Both were orphaned around 10
years =
of
> age, fostered by a philosopher and at around 18 became a charge of
Plato.
> Both were said to be quite handsome. =A0 When the possibility that
Aristot=
le
> thus not only knew Socrates but was actually his boy-lover "Phaedo", the
> following 80 quotes were extracted from the works of Aristotle, some of
th=
em
> actually quoting Socrates quite authoritatively, consistent with him
knowi=
ng
> him. =A0It also becomes apparent that Aristotle was a huge admirer of
> Socrates. =A0 Here are the 80 quotes for future reference:
>
> -------------------
> TOTAL 80 REFERENCES
>
> 5 from Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics
>
> Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics book 1, section 1216b
> Accordingly [b]Socrates[/b] the senior thought that the End is to get to
> know virtue, and he pursued an inquiry into the nature of justice and
> courage and each of the divisions of virtue. (1.29)
>
> Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics book 3, section 1229a
> Second is military courage; this is due to experience and to knowledge,
no=
t
> of what is formidable, as [b]Socrates[/b] said, but of ways of
encounterin=
g
> what is formidable. (1.86)
>
> Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics book 3, section 1230a
> For the fact is the exact opposite of the view of [b]Socrates[/b], who
> thought that bravery was knowledge: sailors who know how to go aloft are
n=
ot
> daring through knowing what things are formidable, but because they know
h=
ow
> to protect themselves against the dangers; also courage is not merely
what=
> makes men more daring fighters, for in that case strength and wealth
would=
> be courage-as Theognis puts it:
> For every man by poverty subdued.
> (1.63)
>
> Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics book 7, section 1235a
> Others hold that only what is useful is a friend, the proof being that
all=
> men actually do pursue the useful, and discard what is useless even in
the=
ir
> own persons (as the old [b]Socrates[/b] used to say, instancing spittle,
> hair and nails), and that we throw away even parts of the body that are
of=
> no use, and finally the body itself, when it dies, as a corpse is
> useless-but people that have a use for it keep it, as in Egypt. (2.74)
>
> Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics book 8, section 1247b
> Therefore this will not be a matter of fortune; but when the same result
> follows from indeterminate and in definite antecedents, it will be good
or=
> bad for somebody, but there will not be the knowledge of it that comes
by
> experience, since, if there were, some fortunate persons would learn it,
o=
r
> indeed all branches of knowledge would, as [b]Socrates[/b] said, be
forms =
of
> good fortune. (1.67)
>
> 31 from Aristotle, Metaphysics
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 1, section 981a
> To have a judgement that when Callias was suffering from this or that
> disease this or that benefited him, and similarly with [b]Socrates[/b]
and=
> various other individuals, is a matter of experience; but to judge that
it=
> benefits all persons of a certain type, considered as a class, who
suffer
> from this or that disease (e.g. the phlegmatic or bilious when suffering
> from burning fever) is a matter of art. (1.67)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 1, section 981a
> For it is not man that the physician cures, except incidentally, but
Calli=
as
> or [b]Socrates[/b] or some other person similarly named, who is
incidental=
ly
> a man as well. (1.81)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 1, section 983b
> Similarly we do not say that [b]Socrates[/b] comes into being absolutely
> when he becomes handsome or cultured, nor that he is destroyed when he
los=
es
> these qualities; because the substrate, [b]Socrates[/b] himself,
persists.=
> (3.30)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 1, section 987b
> And when [b]Socrates[/b], disregarding the physical universe and
confining=
> his study to moral questions, sought in this sphere for the universal
and
> was the first to concentrate upon definition, Plato followed him and
assum=
ed
> that the problem of definition is concerned not with any sensible thing
bu=
t
> with entities of another kind; for the reason that there can be no
general=
> definition of sensible things which are always changing. (1.36)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 1, section 991a
> To say that the Forms are patterns, and that other things participate in
> them, is to use empty phrases and poetical metaphors; for what is it
that
> fa****ons things on the model of the Ideas Besides, anything may both be
an=
d
> become like something else without being imitated from it; thus a man
may
> become just like [b]Socrates[/b] whether [b]Socrates[/b] exists or
not,and=
> even if [b]Socrates[/b] were eternal, clearly the case would be the
same.
> (2.72)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 1, section 991b
> Is it because things are other numbers, e.g. such and such a number Man,
> such and such another [b]Socrates[/b], such and such another Callias?
(3.4=
6)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 3, section 1003a
> But if the common predicate be hypostatized as an individual thing,
> [b]Socrates[/b] will be several beings: himself, and Man, and
Animal-that
> is, if each predicate denotes one particular thing. (2.96)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 4, section 1004b
> If this is not so, who is it who in will investigate whether
> "[b]Socrates[/b] " and "[b]Socrates[/b] seated" are the same thing; or
> whether one thing has one contrary, or what the contrary is, or how many
> meanings it has? (7.20)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 4, section 1007b
> But it is not in this sense-that both terms are accidents of something
> else-that [b]Socrates[/b] is cultured. (1.10)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 4, section 1007b
> Therefore since some accidents are predicated in the latter and some in
th=
e
> former sense, such as are predicated in the way that "white" is of
> [b]Socrates[/b] cannot be an infinite series in the upper direction;
e.g.
> there cannot be another accident of "white [b]Socrates[/b]," for the sum
o=
f
> these predications does not make a single statement. (1.68)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 4, section 1007b
> Nor can "white " have a further accident, such as "cultured"; for the
form=
er
> is no more an accident of the latter than vice versa; and besides we
have
> distinguished that although some predicates are accidental in this
sense,
> others are accidental in the sense that "cultured" is to
[b]Socrates[/b];
> and whereas in the former case the accident is an accident of an
accident,=
> it is not so in the latter; and thus not all predications will be of
> accidents. (2.96)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 5, section 1017a
> Similarly too in affirmation and negation; e.g., in "[b]Socrates[/b] is
> cultured" "is" means that this is true; or in "[b]Socrates[/b] is
not-whit=
e"
> that this is true; but in "the diagonal is not commensurable""is not"
mean=
s
> that the statement is false. (3.86)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 5, section 1018a
> "[b]Socrates[/b]" and "cultured [b]Socrates[/b]" seem to be the same;
but
> "[b]Socrates[/b]" is not a class-name, and hence we do not say "every
> [b]Socrates[/b]" as we say "every man. (5.20)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 5, section 1024b
> Now in one sense there is only one definition of each thing, namely that
o=
f
> its essence; but in another sense there are many definitions, since the
> thing itself, and the thing itself qualified (e.g. "[b]Socrates[/b]" and
> "cultured [b]Socrates[/b]") are in a sense the same. (4.75)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1032a
> It is obvious that the sophistical objections to this thesis are met in
th=
e
> same way as the question whether [b]Socrates[/b] is the same as the
essenc=
e
> of [b]Socrates[/b]; for there is no difference either in the grounds for
> asking the question or in the means of meeting it successfully. (4.51)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1033b
> The whole individual, Callias or [b]Socrates[/b], corresponds to "this
> bronze sphere," but "man" and "animal" correspond to bronze sphere in
> general. (1.33)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1034a
> The completed whole, such-and-such a form induced in this flesh and
these
> bones, is Callias or [b]Socrates[/b]. (1.91)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1035b
> But individually [b]Socrates[/b] is already composed of ultimate matter;
a=
nd
> similarly in all other cases. (1.81)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1036b
> And the analogy in the case of the living thing which the younger
> [b]Socrates[/b] used to state is not a good one; for it leads one away
fro=
m
> the truth, and makes one suppose that it is possible for a man to exist
> without his parts, as a circle does without the bronze. (1.43)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1037a
> And "[b]Socrates[/b]" or "Coriscus" has a double sense, that is if the
sou=
l
> too can be called [b]Socrates[/b] (for by [b]Socrates[/b] some mean the
so=
ul
> and some the concrete person); but if [b]Socrates[/b] means simply this
so=
ul
> and this body, the individual is composed similarly to the universal.
(6.9=
1)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1037b
> But such things as are material or are compounded with matter are not
the
> same as their essence; not even if they are accidentally one, e.g.
> [b]Socrates[/b] and "cultured"; for these are only accidentally the
same.
> (1.76)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1038b
> Again, a substance will be present in "[b]Socrates[/b]," who is a
substanc=
e;
> so that it will be the substance of two things. (1.10)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1040a
> The formula, then, is general; but the sun was supposed to be an
individua=
l,
> like Cleon or [b]Socrates[/b]. (2.41)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 10, section 1055b
> For if we always use the word "whether" in an antithesis-e.g., "whether
it=
> is white or black," or "whether it is white or not" (but we do not ask
> "whether it is a man or white," unless we are proceeding upon some
> assumption, and asking, for instance, whether it was Cleon who came or
> [b]Socrates[/b]. (1.51)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 12, section 1070a
> There are three kinds of substance: (1.) matter, which exists
individually=
> in virtue of being apparent(for everything which is characterized by
conta=
ct
> and so not by coalescence is matter and substrate; e.g. fire, flesh and
> head;these are all matter, and the last is the matter of a substance in
th=
e
> strictest sense); (2.) the "nature"(existing individually)-i.e. a kind
of
> positive state which is the terminus of motion; and (3.) the particular
> combination of these, e.g. [b]Socrates[/b] or Callias. (1.02)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 12, section 1074a
> But all things which are many in number have matter (for one and the
same
> definition applies to many individuals, e.g. that of "man"; but
> [b]Socrates[/b] is one), but the primary essence has no matter, because
it=
> is complete reality. (1.76)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 13, section 1078b
> Now [b]Socrates[/b] devoted his attention to the moral virtues, and was
th=
e
> first to seek a general definition of these(for of the Physicists
Democrit=
us
> gained only a superficial grasp of the subject and defined, after a
fa****o=
n,
> "the hot" and "the cold"; while the Pythagoreans at an earlier date had
> arrived at definitions of some few things-whose formulae they connected
wi=
th
> numbers-e.g., what "op****tunity" is, or "justice" or "marriage"); and he
> naturally inquired into the essence of things;for he was trying to
reason
> logically, and the starting-point of all logical reasoning is the
essence.=
> (1.51)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 13, section 1078b
> There are two innovations which, may fairly be ascribed to
[b]Socrates[/b]=
:
> inductive reasoning and general definition. (2.74)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 13, section 1078b
> But whereas [b]Socrates[/b] regarded neither universals nor definitions
as=
> existing in separation, the Idealists gave them a separate existence,
and =
to
> these universals and definitions of existing things they gave the name
of
> Ideas. (1.29)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 13, section 1079b
> Besides, anything may both be and come to be without being imitated from
> something else; thus a man may become like [b]Socrates[/b] whether
> [b]Socrates[/b] exists or not,and even if [b]Socrates[/b] were eternal,
> clearly the case would be the same. (4.56)
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics book 13, section 1086b
> This theory, as we have said in an earlier passage, was initiated by
> [b]Socrates[/b] as a result of his definitions, but he did not separate
> universals from particulars; and he was right in not separating them.
(1.6=
7)
>
> 7 from Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
>
> Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) bekker page 1116b, bekker
> line 1
> (2) Again, experience of some particular form of danger is taken for a
sor=
t
> of Courage; hence arose [b]Socrates[/b]' notion that Courage is
Knowledge.=
> (2.41)
>
> Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) bekker page 1127b, bekker
> line 20
> These also mostly disown qualities held in high esteem, as
[b]Socrates[/b]=
> used to do. (1.16)
>
> Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) bekker page 1144b, bekker
> line 1
> Hence some people maintain that all the virtues are forms of Prudence;
and=
> [b]Socrates[/b]' line of enquiry was right in one way though wrong in
> another; he was mistaken in thinking thatall the virtues are forms of
> Prudence, but right in saying that they cannot exist without Prudence.
> (1.19)
>
> Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) bekker page 1144b, bekker
> line 20
> [b]Socrates[/b] then thought that the virtues are principles, for he
said
> that they are all of them forms of knowledge. (2.81)
>
> Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) bekker page 1145b, bekker
> line 20
> Some people say that he cannot do so when he knows the act to be wrong;
> since, as [b]Socrates[/b] held, it would be strange if, when a man
possess=
ed
> Knowledge, some other thing should overpower it, and 'drag it about like
a=
> slave. (1.51)
>
> Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) bekker page 1145b, bekker
> line 20
> In fact [b]Socrates[/b] used to combat the view altogether, implying
that
> there is no such thing as Unrestraint, since no one, he held, acts
contrar=
y
> to what is best, believing what he does to be bad, but only through
> ignorance. (2.06)
>
> Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) bekker page 1147b, bekker
> line 1
> But inasmuch as the last premise, which originates action, is an opinion
a=
s
> to some object of sense, and it is this opinion which the unrestrained
man=
> when under the influence of passion either does not possess, or only
> possesses in a way which as we saw does not amount to knowing it but
only
> makes him repeat it as the drunken man repeats the maxims of Empedocles,
a=
nd
> since the ultimate term is not a universal, and is not deemed to be an
> object of Scientific Knowledge in the same way as a universal term is,
we =
do
> seem to be led to the conclusion which [b]Socrates[/b] sought to
establish=
..
> (1.36)
>
> 25 from Aristotle, Politics
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 1, section 1260a
> Hence it is manifest that all the persons mentioned have a moral virtue
of=
> their own, and that the temperance of a woman and that of a man are not
th=
e
> same, nor their courage and justice, as [b]Socrates[/b] thought, but the
o=
ne
> is the courage of command, and the other that of subordination, and the
ca=
se
> is similar with the other virtues. (1.08)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1261a
> For example, it is possible for the citizens to have children, wives and
> possessions in common with each other, as in Plato's Republic, in which
> [b]Socrates[/b] says that there must be community of children, women and
> possessions. (2.06)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1261a
> Now for all the citizens to have their wives in common involves a
variety =
of
> difficulties; in particular, (1) the object which [b]Socrates[/b]
advances=
> as the reason why this enactment should be made clearly does not follow
fr=
om
> his arguments; also (2) as a means to the end which he asserts should be
t=
he
> fundamental object of the city, the scheme as actually set forth in the
> dialogue is not practicable; yet (3) how it is to be further worked out
ha=
s
> been nowhere definitely stated. (1.96)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1261a
> I refer to the ideal of the fullest possible unity of the entire state,
> which [b]Socrates[/b] takes as his fundamental principle. (0.85)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1261b
> Again, even granting that it is best for the community to be as complete
a=
> unity as possible, complete unity does not seem to be proved by the
formul=
a
> 'if all the citizens say "Mine" and "Not mine" at the same time,' which
> [b]Socrates[/b] thinks to be a sign of thecity's being completely one.
> (3.46)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1261b
> If it means 'each severally,' very likely this would more fully realize
th=
e
> state of things which [b]Socrates[/b] wishes to produce (for in that
case
> every citizen will call the same boy his son and also the same woman his
> wife, and will speak in the same way of property and indeed of each of
the=
> accessories of life) but ex hypothesi the citizens, having community of
> women and children, will not call them 'theirs' in this sense, but will
me=
an
> theirs collectively and not severally, and similarly they will call
proper=
ty
> 'theirs' meaning the property of them all, not of each of them
severally.
> (1.19)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1262b
> But speaking generally such a law is bound to bring about the opposite
sta=
te
> of things to that which rightly enacted laws ought properly to cause,
and
> because of which [b]Socrates[/b] thinks it necessary to make these
> regulations about the children and women. (1.10)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1262b
> For we think that friend****p is the greatest of blessings for the state,
> since it is the best safeguard against revolution, and the unity of the
> state, which [b]Socrates[/b] praises most highly, both appears to be and
i=
s
> said by him to be the effect of friend****p, just as we know that
> Aristophanes in the discourses on love describes how the lovers owing to
> their extreme affection desire to grow together and both become one
instea=
d
> of being two. (1.51)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1263b
> The cause of [b]Socrates[/b]' error must be deemed to be that his
> fundamental assumption was incorrect. (2.29)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264a
> Moreover, the working of the constitution as a whole in regard to the
> members of the state has also not been described by [b]Socrates[/b], nor
i=
s
> it easy to say what it will be. (1.36)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264a
> For [b]Socrates[/b] makes the Guardians a sort of garrison, while the
> Farmers, Artisans and other cl***** are the citizens. (1.91)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264a
> But quarrels and lawsuits and all the other evils which according to
> [b]Socrates[/b] exist in actual states will all be found among his
citizen=
s
> too. (1.55)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264b
> But again, if [b]Socrates[/b] intends to make the Farmers have their
wives=
> in common but their property private, who is to manage the household in
th=
e
> way in which the women's husbands will carry on the work of the farms?
> (2.96)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264b
> It is also strange that [b]Socrates[/b] employs the comparison of the
lowe=
r
> animals to show that the women are to have the same occupations as the
men=
,
> considering that animals have no households to manage. (2.47)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264b
> Also [b]Socrates[/b]' method of appointing the magistrates is not a safe
> one. (1.81)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264b
> But it is clear that he is compelled to make the same persons govern
alway=
s,
> for the god-given admixture of gold in the soul is not bestowed on some
at=
> one time and others at another time, but is always in the same men, and
> [b]Socrates[/b] says that at the moment of birth some men receive an
> admixture of gold and others of silver and those who are to be the
Artisan=
s
> and Farmers an admixture of copper and iron. (1.96)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264b
> The Republic discussed by [b]Socrates[/b] therefore possesses these
> difficulties and also others not smaller than these. (1.96)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264b
> For in the Republic [b]Socrates[/b] has laid down details about very few
> matters-regulations about community of wives and children and about
> property, and the structure of the constitution (for the mass of the
> population is divided into two parts, one forming the Farmer class and
the=
> other the class that defends the state in war, and there is a third
class
> drawn from these latter that forms the council and governs the state),
but=
> about the Farmers and the Artisans, whether they are excluded from
> government or have some part in it, and whether these cl***** also are
to
> possess arms and to serve in war with the others or not, on these points
> [b]Socrates[/b] has made no decision, but though he thinks that the
women
> ought to serve in war with the Guardians and share the same education,
the=
> rest of the discourse he has filled up with external topics, and about
the=
> sort of education which it is proper for the Guardians to have. (2.98)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1265a
> Now it is true that all the discourses of [b]Socrates[/b] possess
> brilliance, cleverness, originality and keenness of inquiry, but it is
no
> doubt difficult to be right about everything: for instance with regard
to
> the size of population just mentioned it must not be over-looked that a
> territory as large as that of Babylon will be needed for so many
> inhabitants, or some other country of unlimited extent, to sup****t five
> thousand men in idleness and another swarm of women and servants around
th=
em
> many times as numerous. (2.29)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 4, section 1291a
> For [b]Socrates[/b] says that the most necessary elements of which a
state=
> is composed are four, and he specifies these as a weaver, a farmer, a
> shoemaker and a builder; and then again he adds, on the ground that
these
> are not self-sufficient, a copper-smith and the people to look after the
> necessary live-stock, and in addition a merchant and a retail trader.
(1.1=
0)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 5, section 1316a
> The subject of revolutions is discussed by [b]Socrates[/b] in the
Republic=
,
> but is not discussed well. (2.54)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 5, section 1316a
> He says that the cause is that nothing is permanent but everything
changes=
> in a certain cycle, and that change has its origin in those numbers
'whose=
> basic ratio 4 : 3 linked with the number 5 gives two harmonies,'-meaning
> whenever the number of this figure becomes cubed,-in the belief that
natur=
e
> sometimes engenders men that are evil, and too strong for education to
> influence-speaking perhaps not ill as far as this particular dictum goes
> (for it is possible that there are some persons incapable of being
educate=
d
> and becoming men of noble character), but why should this process of
> revolution belong to the constitution which [b]Socrates[/b] speaks of as
t=
he
> best, more than to all the other forms of constitution, and to all men
tha=
t
> come into existence? (1.70)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 5, section 1316b
> And although there are several forms of oligarchy and of democracy,
> [b]Socrates[/b] speaks of the revolutions that occur in them as though
the=
re
> were only one form of each. (1.29)
>
> Aristotle, Politics book 8, section 1342a
> [b]Socrates[/b] in the Republic does not do well in allowing only the
> Phrygian mode along with the Dorian, and that when he has rejected the
flu=
te
> among instruments; for the Phrygian mode has the same effect among
harmoni=
es
> as the flute among instruments-both are violently exciting and
emotional.
> (0.75)
>
> Aristotle, Politics
> Therefore some musical experts also rightly criticize [b]Socrates[/b]
> because he disapproved of the relaxed harmonies for amusement, taking
them=
> to have the character of intoxication, not in the sense of the effect of
> strong drink, for that clearly has more the result of making men
frenzied
> revellers, but as failing in power. (1.10)
>
> 12 from Aristotle, Rhetoric
>
> Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1356b
> Now, that which is persuasive is persuasive in reference to some one,
and =
is
> persuasive and convincing either at once and in and by itself, or
because =
it
> appears to be proved by propositions that are convincing; further, no
art
> has the particular in view, medicine for instance what is good for
> [b]Socrates[/b] or Callias, but what is good for this or that class of
> persons (for this is a matter that comes within the province of an art,
> whereas the particular is infinite and cannot be the subject of a true
> science); similarly, therefore, Rhetoric will not consider what seems
> probable in each individual case, for instance to [b]Socrates[/b] or
> Hippias, but that which seems probable to this or that class of persons.
> (2.55)
>
> Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1357b
> Among signs, some are related as the particular to the universal; for
> instance, if one were to say that all wise men are just, because
> [b]Socrates[/b] was both wise and just. (1.96)
>
> Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1367b
> We ought also to consider in whose presence we praise, for, as
> [b]Socrates[/b] said, it is not difficult to praise Athenians among
> Athenians. (2.06)
>
> Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1382a
> Anger has always an individual as its object, for instance Callias or
> [b]Socrates[/b], whereas hatred applies to cl*****; for instance, every
on=
e
> hates a thief or informer. (1.51)
>
> Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1390b
> Highly gifted families often degenerate into maniacs, as, for example,
the=
> descendants of Alcibiades and the elder Dionysius; those that are stable
> into fools and dullards, like the descendants of Cimon, Pericles, and
> [b]Socrates[/b]. (3.04)
>
> Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1393b
> Comparison is illustrated by the sayings of [b]Socrates[/b]; for
instance,=
> if one were to say that magistrates should not be chosen by lot, for
this
> would be the same as choosing as representative athletes not those
compete=
nt
> to contend, but those on whom the lot falls; or as choosing any of the
> sailors as the man who should take the helm, as if it were right that
the
> choice should be decided by lot, not by a man's knowledge. (1.91)
>
> Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1398a
> Also, the reason why [b]Socrates[/b] refused to visit Archelaus,
declaring=
> that it was disgraceful not to be in a position to return a favor as
well =
as
> an injury. (2.23)
>
> Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1398b
> Or as Aristippus, when in his opinion Plato had expressed himself too
> presumptuously, said, "Our friend at any rate never spoke like that,"
> referring to [b]Socrates[/b]. (1.47)
>
> Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1399a
> There is an instance of this in the [b]Socrates[/b] of Theodectes: "What
> holy place has he profaned? (2.89)
>
> Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1415b
> For [b]Socrates[/b] says truly in his Funeral Oration that "it is easy
to
> praise Athenians in the presence of Athenians, but not in the presence
of
> Lacedaemonians. (1.91)
>
> Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1419a
> For instance, [b]Socrates[/b], when accused by Meletus of not believing
in=
> the gods, asked whether he did not say that there was a divine
something;
> and when Meletus said yes, [b]Socrates[/b] went on to ask if divine
beings=
> were not either children of the gods or something godlike. (3.14)
>
> Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1419a
> When Meletus again said yes, [b]Socrates[/b] rejoined, "Is there a man,
> then, who can admit that the children of the gods exist without at the
sam=
e
> time admitting that the gods exist? (2.01)
>
> END
>
> Lars Wilson
You never seem to get to the part where some proves that Socrates was
not forced to drink hemlock in 399 B.C.E. and where this proof where
to come from. Aristocles met and was taught by Socrates from 407
B.C., until Socrates death, what would he gain by setting Socrates
death in 399 as everyone else noted as well? As for Aristotle, born
in 384 B.C.E., still would have just been 18 when Socrates would have
died in this "new" time. Why would Aristotle not have mentioned it?
He is never known to have said any different. We still are not sure
was was in Aristocles' "Republic" and his supposed conversations with
Socrates that are not his thoughts, instead of Socrates. Again, as
you don't mention where this proof that Socrates lived passed 399
B.C.E. comes from, one cannot pass judgement until one sees it. But,
if so, then Aristocles and Aristotle both would have a lot to answer
for, now, wouldn't they? Regards, Ken Hogan
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