On 29 Sep, 20:51, "Ken Miner" <mi...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> "LudovicoVan" <ju...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote in message
>
news:c3176033-6bbe-4aad-ac26-b495de4c86d7@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> >[...]
> >Complete knowledge reduces to static >omnicomprehension and so it is
> >incongruent with the principles of dynamism >underlying the historical
> >discourse. Thus, a history of science where >science will a day
> >understand everything is a logical impossibility. []
> >More informally: a perspective that admits >complete knowledge is only
> >compatible with a perspective that is >fundamentally anti-historic.
> >Something like a contradiction in terms.
> >-LV
>
> This is very straightforward. Where does one learn more about these
> principles of dynamism and when did they begin to be understood and by
whom?
As the apex of an older tradition, it is Hegelian dialectic the
underlying solid ground for later western development: be it the
continental structuralism as well as the post-structuralism, or be it
the systemic/organicistic views from cybernetics, and just to name a
few. There is a common notion of "process" that is fundamental to all
philosopical discorse in the modern and then contem****ary epoch, even
when to be, as in philosophy, rather the subject of a scrutiny.
BTW, I have also read some introductions on the web to the philosophy
of history, but I find they all miss the point and are already into
theoretical history as such. We need philosophy to get what it is at
all about history.
> I have followed up the earlier lead of John Wilkins (pessimistic
induction)
> as a critique of scientific realism, but that issue seems to reduce to a
> language problem, since it involves the notion "approximately true" and
> ignores, as far as I can see, all theories of truth other than the
> correspondence theory.
I am not familiar with this critique, I've just had a look at the
article on WP: it seems it is responding to a previous argument aimed
at sup****ting the realistic view, itself based on induction. At a very
first glance, I'd just say it doesn't hold more than the realism it is
criticising: same flaw, same myth, that is. They mistake induction for
what makes induction possible, and that is -in a word- "belief". One
for all, Peter F. Strawson, a philosopher of language more than a
logician, goes into this specific issue.
-LV
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