Ken Miner <miner@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> "LudovicoVan" <julio@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote in message
>
news:c3176033-6bbe-4aad-ac26-b495de4c86d7@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> >[...]
>
> >Complete knowledge reduces to static >omnicomprehension and so it is
> >incongruent with the principles of dynamism >underlying the historical
> >discourse. Thus, a history of science where >science will a day
> >understand everything is a logical impossibility. []
>
> >More informally: a perspective that admits >complete knowledge is only
> >compatible with a perspective that is >fundamentally anti-historic.
> >Something like a contradiction in terms.
>
> >-LV
>
> This is very straightforward. Where does one learn more about these
> principles of dynamism and when did they begin to be understood and by
whom?
>
> I have followed up the earlier lead of John Wilkins (pessimistic
induction)
> as a critique of scientific realism, but that issue seems to reduce to a
> language problem, since it involves the notion "approximately true" and
> ignores, as far as I can see, all theories of truth other than the
> correspondence theory.
>
That seems to be correct. Coherence, or foundherentist, theories of
truth are not subject to the PMI. However, I don't think this is *just*
a matter of language, although analytic philosophy is often mostly
linguitic in bent. If we have the notion that truth is correspondence to
the world (say, structural isomorphism, qua the structural realist
view), then the linguistic side is the model, and the question is
whether the model will represent the world correctly.
--
John S. Wilkins, Philosophy, University of Queensland
scienceblogs.com/evolvingthoughts
But al be that he was a philosophre,
Yet hadde he but litel gold in cofre
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