16.0
[S-Day. We are entering the most disputed part of the what-if, so all of
the
following instalments will initially be tentative. I am even more open
than
until now to your comments, suggestions and criticism]
Now that the day of Seelöwe has come, the crux of the problem for the
Luftwaffe is how to distribute its limited assets to cover all the
numerous
and difficult tasks it has to carry out.
The first and most im****tant job is to protect the landing areas and the
invasion armada as it unloads. A weighty standing force of fighters will
be
needed here, at all times during daylight. Kesselring reckons that in
order
to be sure he can keep 80 fighters out there at all times, he needs to set
aside some 250 of them. They will fly in relays and make extensive use of
the remaining drop tanks. Even so, this means no more than 20 fighters on
patrol over each of the four landing areas, while these pilots will need
to
fly 4 or 5 sorties per day, depending upon the intensity of the enemy
attacks.
The fighters assigned to this task but not currently airborne can be, of
course, scrambled on alarm; this can be done if the defenders of the
beachheads signal they are being overwhelmed, or in order to intercept
British attacks against French or Dutch ****ts. Of course, if this happens
the sorties will pile up, and anyway, it takes some time to reach the
English coast, even from bases in the Pas de Calais.
The second but no less critical task is to keep the Royal Navy at bay.
Wever
has been told countless times by now by his Kriegsmarine colleagues that
the
fleet has no chance of survival, unless the Luftwaffe does what the German
war****p cannot do. So, for the first day of Seelöwe, 250 of the some 300
Ju
87 will be assigned to this task. Obviously these lame ducks can't be sent
out alone, but Kesselring reckons he can assign just 200 Bf 109s to escort
them. It's a paltry ratio, but these missions will take place over the
sea;
Kesselring thinks the British fighters will have other things to do than
to
interfere out there. Besides, there are much less British fighters by now,
and their operational bases are farther from the Channel - or so he
believes.
This leaves just some 100 Bf 109s for other tasks. Which is a problem when
it comes to the level bomber force available; the Germans have almost 900
of
them, but if they keep sticking to the ratios used until now (at least 2
escort fighters per bomber), they could use only 50 of them! Kesselring
decides he will use a 1:1 ratio for 50 Heinkels and 50 Bf 109s, which he
will keep as his reserve and for other tasks. Additionally, he will use a
sizable part of his level bombers (some 400 of them) for the initial
ground
sup****t missions over the beachheads; after all, numbers count for
something, and these areas are patrolled by the above-mentioned CAPs. To
these 400 level bombers he adds the remaining 50 Stukas for pinpoint
direct
sup****t missions.
Some 450 level bombers remain unused! So they will go out for a final
night
bombing assault before dawn, and then remain available. These night
attacks
will be aimed at naval bases, army barracks, railroad marshalling yards
and,
once more, Fighter Command airfields.
At this point, Kesselring is left with some 90 Bf 110s and the last 50 Bf
109s. 40 of the two-engined aircraft will integrate the direct sup****t to
the ground forces, as fighter/bombers. The remaining 50, together with the
Bf 109s, will provide a 100-strong escort for the last but not least
Luftwaffe effort: the parachute airdrops.
Coastal, long-range and some of the short-range recon aircraft will serve
as
the eyes of the anti-****pping details; those Royal Navy ****ps have to be
found first. The obsolescent seaplanes will also have a go with their
ineffective torpedoes. Other minor units are, as customary, directly
attached to the Heer; they will serve in their primary role of recon, but
also, four of them will be used for calling down CAS missions. They are
redundant, because the same role will be carried out by Luftwaffe FAC
teams
having their own radios and light vehicles, assigned to the four landing
areas. These won't be able to call down level bomber raids; only the Bf
110s
and, to a lesser extent, the Stukas, will have short enough response times
to be useful in this role.
Switching now to the RAF's perspective, heated arguments have been going
on
over the last few days and even hours as to how to use its assets. Nobody
could deny that the Royal Navy's task forces would be going to need air
cover, so Dowding has grudgingly conceded some of that, especially from
the
peripheral Squadrons, those of #10 and #12 Groups (by now, he has also
taken
care to deploy all of his most experienced Squadrons to #11 Group, so that
the veteran pilots can fight for the true air superiority contest). On the
other hand, he has adamantly refused to employ fighters as escorts to
bomber
attacks, at least not immediately. He has pointed out that if the
air-to-air
battle is won, then nobody will molest the British bombers, and in order
to
defeat the German fighters, he has to have his hands free. The Air Staff
could have easily overruled him, were it not for the fact that Bomber
Command eggheads are still convinced that their theory that the bomber
will
always get through may still be proved true. The compromise that has been
reached in a final Air Ministry meeting is that in the afternoon of
invasion
day, Fighter Command will try to swamp the German fighter defenses over
the
beachheads, and if Bomber Command will be able to time a strike surge
correctly, they should find them unprotected.
On September 14, Dowding has also given his final activation order to his
own little trick. All through the so called "combat zone" close to the
coast, #11 Group has redeployed several Squadrons. Only, they are not
based
in Fighter Command airfields. #32 Squadron is hidden in the hangars of
Detling, among the trainers of the FAA; the abandoned strip of Andover
still
looks abandoned, but #152 Squadron has just set up shop there; West
Malling
hosts the Poles of #303 Squadron, the Royal Aircraft Establishment
airstrips
of Farnborough are now home to #605 Squadron. Other units are stabled with
Bomber Command (whence the accidental destruction of a handful of
Hurricanes
during one of the raids against it) or Coastal Command. A few experimental
top-secret emergency strips also exist: nothing more than fields along the
edge of wooded areas, with the trees and camouflage netting hiding the
dispersal places from enemy recon; critical stages of the work on these
has
been carried out in rainy days. Dowding has played a Judo move on
Kesselring, turning his opponent's strength against him; the concentration
on Fighter Command airfields, in itself a correct choice, will be a
drawback. Park has plenty of forward-deployed fighters to send up quickly,
and the Germans do not even know where they are.
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