More than any of the vice-presidential vacancies of previous years, that
of late 1963 to early 1965 led to a determination to do something about
the problem once and for all. There were probably a number of reasons for
this: (1) First, there was the sheer shock of the first presidential
assassination since 1901. People thought, If JFK had been assassinated,
couldn't that happen to LBJ as well? (2) Moreover, LBJ had had a serious
heart attack several years earlier. (And memories of Ike's heart atacks
were still fairly fresh.) (3) Speaker of the House John McCormack, who
was next in line after LBJ, was--though esteemed by his colleagues--
elderly, and nobody's choice for a plausible presidential candidate. (4)
In the nuclear age, the possibility of having a President whom nobody had
thought of for the job was obviously a much more serious matter than it
would have been several decades earlier.
For these reasons, Senator Birch Bayh's Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments (of the Senate Judiciary Committee) held hearings on possible
solutions to the problem of vice-presidential vacancies. I have already
dealt with the idea of dealing with the problem by statutory means
(creating a "First Secretary" or "Deputy President" to be next in line of
succession after the Vice-President).
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/913ff66a7ee141aa
Here I will discuss proposed solutions requiring constitutional amendments
(other than the one actually adopted--see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twenty-Fifth_Amendment
--appointment by the
President with confirmation by both houses of Congress). For each of
these solutions, it would be interesting to ask whether they would have
made a difference after Agnew's resignation in 1973 (assuming that they
don't butterfly it--or Nixon's Watergate problems--away). (I am
concentrating on whether Ford would have become Vice-President and then
President under the alternate proposals--but of course there is also the
question of whether, even if Ford had become President as in OTL, Nelson
Rockefeller would still have become Vice-President...) My source is John
Feerick, *From Failing Hands: The Story of Presidential Succession* (New
York: Fordham University Press 1965), pp. 258-263.
(1) A special election. This was objected to on the ground that it would
disrupt the normal processes of government, and at a time when the nation
(especially if it was mourning the death of a President) might not be
receptive to the activities incident to a political campaign. Moreover,
it might result in a candidate of a party other than the President's being
elected. Anyway, let's suppose this idea was adopted. Who would each
party nominate for vice-president in 1973 and who would be most likely to
win? (Also, if a Democrat wins, don't Congressional Republicans become a
lot more resistant to impeachment/conviction of Nixon?)
(2) Re-convene the last Electoral College. This was advocated by former
President Truman and former Vice-President Nixon. Nixon argued that it
was im****tant that the new Vice-President "come from the elective rather
than the appointive process." He observed that the majority of the
member****p of the Electoral College would always be from the President's
own party. However, the obvious objection is that electors are chosen not
to exercise a considered judgment but to carry out the will of the voters
of their states. (The handful who do exercise their own judgment--the
"faithless electors"--are not generally looked on with great favor; and
even they usually emphasize that they would not have voted against their
party's ticket if it would have made any difference in the result.) In
presidential elections, electors ratify the choice of the party convention
(of whichever party carries their state). If we do not trust them to
exercise their own judgment--and they are certainly not chosen for that
purpose nowadays or indeed almost from the beginning of presidential
elections [1]--whose choice would they ratify in this event? The
President's? Maybe, if he had the universal respect of his party--but
that was not the case with Nixon in 1973. The party's National Committee?
Theoretically, it is the highest governing body of the party between
conventions, and in 1912 the Republican National Committee did name
Nicholas Murray Butler to replace the deceased James Sherman as the
party's vice-presidential candidate. But there are no precedents for any
*victorious* presidential tickets (Taft and Butler got only eight
electoral votes in 1912) and in any event in 1912 the Republican
electorate had actually voted in November 1912 for what they knew was a
Taft-Butler ticket, whereas in this scenario nobody but the party National
Committee had decided on the Vice-President when the electors re-convene.
(There was also a more technical objection: Many of the members of the
Electoral College might have died since the last election, so there would
be a delay in filling these vacancies.)
Anyway, suppose this method is chosen. Who do the (overwhelmingly
Republican) electors vote for in 1973? Without having to worry about
Congressional confirmation, does Nixon try to get someone other than Ford,
does the Republican National Committee agree, and how do the electors
react? Furthermore, even if it turns out to be Ford, without having
obtained the confirmation of a Democratic-majority Congress, doesn't he
face much more hostility from the Democrats?
(3) Senator Kenneth Keating (R-New York)'s proposal--provide for the
election of a President and *two* Vice-Presidents every four years. "One
Vice-President would be an Executive Vice-President, who would be first in
the line of succession and ready to undertake assignments for the
President. The other would be a Legislative Vice-President and as such
would be second in line and President of the Senate. Keating remarked
that his two Vice-Presidents would be selected from among the most
competent people in the party, that most Senators, Representatives and
Governors would, indeed, be only too interested in either position, and
that the Legislative Vice-President would be no less busy than the Vice-
President is now. The great advantage of this arrangement, said Keating,
was that both Vice-Presidents would be of the President's party and
elected by the people." Feerick, p. 260.
Nixon objected to this proposal by arguing that dividing the already
limited functions of the Vice-President would be downgrading the office
precisely at a time "when it is im****tant that we add to its prestige and
im****tance." Others suggested that having two Vice-Presidents might
result in neither of them being as adequately prepared as were Nixon and
LBJ to assume the powers and duties of the presidency in cases of
emergency. A further objection was that one or both of the Vice-
Presidents might be chosen to "balance the ticket" regardless of whether
they could work harmoniously with each other or with the President.
(Feerick, p. 260, quotes the *New York Herald* of December 26, 1881, when
Arthur's succesion to the Presidency after Garfield's assassination left
the Vice-Presidency vacant: "There is... [an] ingenious proposition to
elect at least three Vice Presidents every four years.... [This] strikes
us as extremely dextrous. In every national convention there is a large
number of gentlemen who, failing to obtain the first place on the ticket,
are only too glad to accept the second. It is a cause of vexation and
political heartburning that only one can be chosen. Why not satisfy all
parties and make as many Vice Presidents as there are members of the
Convention? In this way all interests and factions might be harmonized.
For this and other equally weighty reasons it is to be hoped the three
Vice Presidential proposition will be adopted with an amendment that the
number shall be increased to three hundred.")
Anyway, let's say this is adopted. Who are Humphrey and Nixon likely to
choose as their *two* running mates each in 1968? Will Nixon (assuming
this change does not affect the outcome of the 1968 election) keep the
same "troika" in 1972? And by 2008 will it be an established custom in
both parties that if the presidential nominee is a white man, at least one
of the vice-presidential nominees must be a woman and/or member of a
racial minority?
(4) Have Congress elect the new Vice-President. This was proposed by
Senator Jacob Javits (R-New York). This would have the advantage of
selection by the representatives of the people without the disadvantages
incident to a special popular election. When it was pointed out that this
might lead to a Vice-President of a different party than that of the
President, Javits modified his proposal to provide for an absolute
presidential veto over Congress' choice.
Superficially, it might seem that the modified Javits proposal would not
be that different from the OTL Twenty-Fifth Amendment: the President
could veto every Congressional choice until Congress chooses someone
satisfactory to him, just as in OTL Congress can veto every presidential
choice until the President chooses someone satisfactory to it. In
practice, though, it would make a difference who proposes the Vice-
President and who has to take the initiative to veto the choice and be
seen as "obstructionist." Just as in OTL, it would not have looked good
for Congress to have vetoed every conceivable choice by Nixon (as a few
Democrats advocated, in the hope of keeping the Vice-Presidency vacant,
impeaching and removing Nixon, and making Carl Albert President) so in
this ATL it would not look good for a President to veto one seemingly
reasonable Congressional choice after another (and it might be especially
difficult for a President in as weak a position as Nixon was in 1973).
Any thoughts? (The Twenty-Fifth Amendment of course also has provisions
on determining presidential inability, but I am not concerned with that
aspect of the Amendment here.)
[1] As early as 1796, the first contested presidential election, the
original assumption that electors would use their own judgment was already
obsolete, and the conduct of Samuel Miles (a Pennsylvania Federalist
elector who voted for Jefferson and Pinckney instead of Adams and
Pinckney) provoked exactly the same kind of indignation seen in the cases
of more recent "faithless electors." As one angry Pennsylvanian wrote in
a letter to the *Gazette of the United States*: "What, do I choose Samuel
Miles to determine for me whether John Adams or Thomas Jefferson shall be
President? No! I choose him to act, not to think."
http://www.fairvote.org/e_college/faithless.htm
--
David Tenner
dtenner@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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