In article <memo.20080706030026.256C@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>,
Richard Gadsden <richard@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
>Could the electoral college have been constructed to be more significant?
>
>Perhaps if the college convened in the capital (ie in DC once it has
>been built) and therefore existed as a collegiate body, and then
>remained in existence for the full term, with perhaps a
>responsibility to scrutinise the presidency and the operations of the
>executive branch.
My only source, Fred Barbash, _The Founding_, p. 182, talks about
August 31 (I think), when Madison was "'baiting'" the proposals --
"Bait was what you inserted in an otherwise unpalatable bill to make
it palatable".
For those worried that the electors might form yet another
power-hungry, intrigue-ridden branch of government, the committee
recommended that the electors from the different states never be
allowed to meet together in one place.
Certainly the history of the Holy Roman Empire should have given pause
to that notion. To secure election, emperor after emperor had to give
more and more privileges or confirm the large privileges already
granted, until the title of "Emperor" was close to being a nullity.
Also, it says on p. 181 that Dickinson and others had seen how bad
things got when the executive was dependent on the legislature for
election; having a body of electors would visit the same evil on the
Constitution, in their minds. Poland had a problem of foreign
intervention in the election of its monarchs -- Russia and Austria had
their bought blocks of lords and brought them out at need.
Federalist Papers #68, written by Hamilton,
<http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed68.htm>,
says
THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United
States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence,
which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received
the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. The most
plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to
admit that the election of the President is pretty well guarded.1
...
It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in
the choice of the person to whom so im****tant a trust was to be
confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of
making it, not to any preestablished body, but to men chosen by
the people for the special purpose, and at the particular
conjuncture. ...
And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and
vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and
divided situation will expose them much less to heats and
ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people,
than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place.
Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable
obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption.
These most deadly adversaries of republican government might
naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more
than one querter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to
gain an improper ascendant in our councils. How could they better
gratify this, than by raising a creature of their own to the chief
magistracy of the Union? But the convention have guarded against
all danger of this sort, with the most provident and judicious
attention. They have not made the appointment of the President to
depend on any preexisting bodies of men, who might be tampered
with beforehand to prostitute their votes; but they have referred
it in the first instance to an immediate act of the people of
America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the tem****ary
and sole purpose of making the appointment. And they have
excluded from eligibility to this trust, all those who from
situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the
President in office. No senator, representative, or other person
holding a place of trust or profit under the United States, can be
of the numbers of the electors. Thus without corrupting the body
of the people, the immediate agents in the election will at least
enter upon the task free from any sinister bias. Their transient
existence, and their detached situation, already taken notice of,
afford a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so, to the
conclusion of it. The business of corruption, when it is to
embrace so considerable a number of men, requires time as well as
means. Nor would it be found easy suddenly to embark them,
dispersed as they would be over thirteen States, in any
combinations founded upon motives, which though they could not
properly be denominated corrupt, might yet be of a nature to
mislead them from their duty.
Another and no less im****tant desideratum was, that the Executive
should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the
people themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his
duty to his complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to
the duration of his official consequence. This advantage will
also be secured, by making his re-election to depend on a special
body of representatives, deputed by the society for the single
purpose of making the im****tant choice.
Unfortunately for his reputation as a prophet, Hamilton goes on to
write
The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office
of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in
an eminent degree endowed with the requisite
qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of
popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors
in a single State; but it will require other talents, and a
different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and
confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a ****tion of
it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for
the distinguished office of President of the United States. It
will not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant
probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent
for ability and virtue.
Oh, well. -- But that doesn't negate the convention's perceptions of
the dangers of a standing body of electors. About the Vice
Presidency,
The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice-President, has
been objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous. ... The other
consideration is, that as the Vice-President may occasionally
become a substitute for the President, in the supreme executive
magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode of election
prescribed for the one, apply with great if not with equal force
to the manner of appointing the other.
This answers the suggestions for any other mode of electing a
president, as by Congress or by a standing Electoral College.
Madison's notes on the Constitutional Convention says that the whole
convention took it up on 4 September, per
<http://www.nhccs.org/dfc-0904.txt>,
including
Mr. GOVr. MORRIS said he would give the reasons of the Committee
and his own. The 1st. was the danger of intrigue & faction if the
appointmt. should be made by the Legislature. 2. [4] the
inconveniency [5] of an ineligibility required by that mode in
order to lessen its evils. ... Many were anxious even for an
immediate choice by the people. 6. [9] the indispensible
necessity of making the Executive independent of the
Legislature. -- As the Electors would vote at the same time
throughout the U. S. and at so great a distance from each other,
the great evil of cabal was avoided. It would be impossible also
to corrupt them. ...
Mr. BUTLER thought the mode not free from objections, but much
more so than an election by the Legislature, where as in elective
monarchies, cabal faction & violence would be sure to
prevail. ...
The election of the President occupied the next several days, but the
business of electors took little more time than that, they mostly
being concerned that "nineteen times out of twenty" the electors would
settle on no man, so would the Senate chuse among the top five, or
what?
(I didn't have time to read it all, but I did like Govenour Morris's
comment that "The vice president then will be the first heir apparent
that ever loved his father.")
> "I disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your
> right to say it" - Attributed to Voltaire
It's actually Beatrice Hall's words, her interpretation of Voltaire's
attitude.
--
Tim McDaniel; Reply-To: tmcd@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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