Re: What IF: ... Japan had more Oilers for Dec.7'41 ?

On Aug 28, 11:38=A0am, Paul J. Adam  wrote:

> >> Similarly, you keep claiming "continuing attack", but seem terribly
> >> uncertain about how long this attack will continue for. When pressed
o=
n
> >> the lack of endurance, and the practical problems of strafing through
=
a
> >> firestorm, you change the story to suggest that actually the strikers
> >> will hit and run quickly. Until you then claim that firefighters will
> >> all be machine-gunned to death by the prowling Zeroes overhead.

Based on the history of the 1st & 2nd strikes, I'm sure that some of
Oahu's firefighters would be straffed, while the tankfarm bombing was
going on, by AH 3rd wave Zeros. I don't recall that I ever called for
"ongoing attacks". As I recall such is entirely an invention of your
own making that you have been "going on about" for several pstings
now.

>Do your own research.
> I have. Not one example of such an incident to be found.

Excellent ! As long as that means that I don't have to hear about fuel
tankfarm fires ever again, I am a very happy man.

> I even checked the Operation ALLIED FORCE Weapons Evaluation Team
> re****ts on strikes on POL storage facilities in Serbia and Kosovo;
> hitting elderly and undefended (and by then unmanned) facilities, using
> laser-guided thousand-pound bombs, the results achieved fell *far* short
> of your claims despite repeated strikes. Oil tanks could be burst, could
> even be ignited, but the conflagration didn't handily leap from tank to
> tank nor drown half of Kosovo in burning petrochemicals despite nobody
> fighting the fires with *any* sort of equipment. The damaged tanks that
> were ignited, burned themselves out: the ones that didn't catch fire
> from the attack, didn't light off later. This on an elderly facility
> built to Eastern Bloc safety standards and entirely unmanned at and
> after the time of the attack.
>
> So I'd say that "doing my own research" pretty thoroughly disproves the
> claim that igniting one or two tanks will incinerate all of Oahu in an
> unstoppable firestorm.

Yet again you exaggerate. I've only ever claimed the surface of Pearl
Harbor and most of downtown Honolulu were vulnerable to oil fed fires.
I've also never claimed that igniting one or two tanks would devastate
an entire tankfarm and the surroundings. I believe that I suggested 1
out of every 6-8 tanks in the tankfarm might provide the necessary
heat. In the case of the East PH that would be about 4 tanks out of
27, not 1 or 2.

But I thank God that you have finally done your own research and that
we can now  progress on to discussing other PH related topics. I am
very sick of circular discussions about tankfarm fires and
firefighters.

> >> You're bringing a much larger force to Hawaii with very little
increas=
e
> >> in its sup****t tail. That's not "removing" difficulties, it's
> >> handwaving.
>
> >What, other than more fuel, do the KB or the CF require for the "hit &
> >run" type of raid that we have discussed here in my 4 related
> >threads ?
>
> Much more fuel, more tankers to carry and transfer it, and more
> destroyers to screen the various units and detached forces - which cause
> their own complications, since it's not just "bringing the fuel", it's
> being able to schedule the RAS programme such that you have time to
> refuel everybody before the first in the queue runs dry.

Since the Kido Butai was historically able to complete all of their re-
fueling requirements quite successfully, I see no reason that the
Combined Fleet could not also make their own arrangements with equal
success. I have already indicated just where the additional fleet
oiler conversions could have come from.

> This isn't helped by the notorious stability problems of Japanese
> destroyers, which leaves them dangerously top-heavy well before their
> fuel gets towards zero, and means they need to RAS pro****tionately much
> more often: which also opens more gaps in the screen, meaning you need
> more destroyers, which rapidly turns the operation into the proverbial
> self-licking lollipop.

The Kido Butai seems to have managed it's destroyer's stability
problems quite successfully during the historical trips both to and
from Hawaii. Why wouldn' the same IJN be able to do so for the CF's
escorting destroyers ?

>It's made worse by having torpedo attack groups
> prowling in one sector, battle****ps in another =A0and the Kido Butai in
a
> third disposed for the set-piece Decisive Battle, since you either need
> to split your oilers and hope you judged consumption correctly, or else
> learn to organise a DELBOY schedule very quickly (which needs even more
> destroyers to escort the oilers, which become absolutely Mission
> Essential Units)

Why not just leave them behind at a pre-determined rendezvous point as
the KB did historically with it's two supply groups ? Why try to re-
invent the wheel ?

> Also more ordnance and a way to rearm at sea, since part of your
> storyline involves fighting the Decisive Battle just off Hawaii - but
> the carriers need to rearm for that.

Why ? The KB's ordnance lockers were not at all emptied by the
historical air strikes against PH, with the exception of their newly
developed 800kg AP bombs made from battle****p shells. Lots of
torpedoes were left over for any US battle****ps that vertured to sea
after being attacked inside of PH.

> And underway repair ****ps, unless vessels damaged in the Decisive Battle
> are to be abandoned off Hawaii.

I'm not aware of any "underway repair ****p" designs  that were in IJN
servise in 1941. Please acquaint me with their names ?

Just as any other navy would expect combat losses, Japan would expect
to loose a few war****ps in winning the Decisive Battle. War is Hell,
afterall.

> In other words, the Japanese only need to do in 1941 what it took the
> USN until 1944 (and nobody else managed it by then, the RN was trailing
> well behind and nobody else tried) to achieve in the field of underway
> logistics and sustaining a fleet well beyond its bases. Out for a
> one-day raid and back is doable: out with enough force for the Pearl
> Harbor raid and _then_ the Decisive Battle, not just hitting and running
> but then staying on station long enough to fight and win a battle, then
> get back nursing any damaged units; that is a very large step that took
> a great deal of climbing.

I really don't see why you think so. After the historical PH air raids
do you see the mangled US Pacific Fleet putting up much of a fight in
the Decisive Battle ? I don't even see them getting out of ****t, let
alone being able to fight effectively. And if they don't come out of
PH on the afternoon of Dec.7'41 then the CF could go close in that
night to bombard them at dawn on the morning of Dec.8'41. Along with
another KB air strike of course.

Why do you feel that the KB and CF would "hang around" Hawaii for
weeks while awaiting the arrival of more US submarines and further
reinforcements from the West Coast and the Atlantic ? Such would be a
foolish move so far from forward bases.