Re: What IF: Japan-Para to PH - staff planning

On Aug 28, 12:59=A0pm, a425couple wrote:

> I guess one of my 'discomforts' with your series of
> threads, and with many responses, is it falls into
> the common American memory/viewpoint of the start
> of our WWII war - as being very "Pearl Harbor centric".

I'm Canadian but point taken.

> I know you, and most responders are very well read,
> and are aware of the other real major campaigns that
> started on that same dawn that was PH's Dec. 7. =A0
> The bulk of the effort, and the real goals were elsewhere
> (P.I., Malaya, Hong Kong, DEI, Wake I. & New Guinea,
> while still fighting in China).

Very true but PH has been so exensively written about that there is
just more information "out there" to research and then work with than
there is about all of the other campaigns that you mentioned,
combined..

> I'm also confident you are aware of the needed
> 'reductions' done in logistics and combat planning
> (i.e. % down for major overhaul, training, last second
> problems etc.)

Knowing that a war WAS coming (since they planned to start it !) the
Japanese did manage to schedule ****pyard time for most of their fleet
units at some time or other in 1941. Although problems such as the
last day breakdown of one of the KB's converted oilers did certainly
occur. Battle****p Mutsu blowing up without warning nor apparent reason
in 1943 being yet another example. Such random events are difficult to
account for in any AH scenario though, save for always including extra
vessels to "take up the slack" should random failure raise its ugly
little head.

> But I'll mention another type of 'asset' - planning ability. =A0
> It is limited!

Certainly history reveals that nearly every Japanese operation planned
pre-war went amazingly well, one suspects because on-site inspection
by qualified Japanese military personnel was usually a mandatory
requirement. Operations planned after the start of the war, when on-
site recon was no longer available to the Japanese, generally failed
to do well at all. IMO.

> Face it, probably around 75% of the product of
> a major operation plan becomes 'moot' when
> you first make contact with the enemy
> (problem is, you can't ahead of time figure out
> what is the good 25% - and what is 'wasted' 75%).
> There is a point when not worth more effort on
> the 'spit ****ne' (especially when detract from other work!)

Having spend decades organizing construction projects with up to 2,500
workers on site, I can relate to this dilema. While not actual combat,
the construction labor wildcat strike is similar in its effects on any
operation's schedule.

> But it is easy afterwards (and granted - interesting also),
> for people to look back in a historical microscope, =A0
> and see some areas that "might have" gone otherwise.
> What Ifs - that seem easy in hindsight, are often
> really improbable/impactical at the time.

"Everything is always easy for those that do not actually have to do
the work."

This is one of the reasons that I think it impossible to project any
AH "What IF" scenario very far into it's own future. Today, we simply
do not have easy access to the background information that yesterday's
planners would have considered to be the foundation of any military
warplan.Our discussions here wrt oiler/tanker conversions highlite
that very point. I can site a source which states that the Japanese
took an average of three ****pyard weeks to convert each of 8 civilian
tankers into auxilliary fleet oilers but I have no way of knowing for
sure if even a 9th set of high spped oil pumps was available anywhere
in 1941 Japan so that the 9th  could be so converted.

> Note - a few months after PH, they put a considerable
> effort into a bombing raid on PH, , note that it had
> virtually no good product, and might in fact of
> really hurt them in long run.

I imagine that you speak of the two seaplane bombing raid on Pearl
Harbor which refueled via submarine at the French Frigate Shoals ?

It certainly did hurt the Japanese prior to Midway as the US had by
then "garrissoned" FFS to ensure that Japanese recon. planes could not
operate from there secretly again.