Re: What IF: ... Japan had more Oilers for Dec.7'41 ?

In message 
<4a67cea1-1826-40a2-b8f8-561402d5590a@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>, 
dabrob <dabrob@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> writes
>On Aug 28, 11:38 am, Paul J. Adam  wrote:
>> >> Similarly, you keep claiming "continuing attack", but seem terribly
>> >> uncertain about how long this attack will continue for. When pressed
on
>> >> the lack of endurance, and the practical problems of strafing
through a
>> >> firestorm, you change the story to suggest that actually the
strikers
>> >> will hit and run quickly. Until you then claim that firefighters
will
>> >> all be machine-gunned to death by the prowling Zeroes overhead.
>
>Based on the history of the 1st & 2nd strikes, I'm sure that some of
>Oahu's firefighters would be straffed, while the tankfarm bombing was
>going on, by AH 3rd wave Zeros.

The firefighters aren't at the tankfarms until they're on fire, unless 
you imagine them standing around in parade order waiting to be 
machine-gunned. It'll take time to call them in, time for them to 
arrive... in which time the raid is over and gone.

>I don't recall that I ever called for
>"ongoing attacks".

"You keep questioning my assertion that fighting an oil tank fire with
1941 technology was largely impossible (let alone when under
continuing atack)" to quote you precisely..

So we can ignore the "continuing attack" as a red herring?

>>Do your own research.
>> I have. Not one example of such an incident to be found.
>
>Excellent ! As long as that means that I don't have to hear about fuel
>tankfarm fires ever again, I am a very happy man.
>
>> I even checked the Operation ALLIED FORCE Weapons Evaluation Team
>> re****ts on strikes on POL storage facilities in Serbia and Kosovo;
>> hitting elderly and undefended (and by then unmanned) facilities, using
>> laser-guided thousand-pound bombs, the results achieved fell *far*
short
>> of your claims despite repeated strikes. Oil tanks could be burst,
could
>> even be ignited, but the conflagration didn't handily leap from tank to
>> tank nor drown half of Kosovo in burning petrochemicals despite nobody
>> fighting the fires with *any* sort of equipment. The damaged tanks that
>> were ignited, burned themselves out: the ones that didn't catch fire
>> from the attack, didn't light off later. This on an elderly facility
>> built to Eastern Bloc safety standards and entirely unmanned at and
>> after the time of the attack.
>>
>> So I'd say that "doing my own research" pretty thoroughly disproves the
>> claim that igniting one or two tanks will incinerate all of Oahu in an
>> unstoppable firestorm.
>
>Yet again you exaggerate. I've only ever claimed the surface of Pearl
>Harbor and most of downtown Honolulu were vulnerable to oil fed fires.
>I've also never claimed that igniting one or two tanks would devastate
>an entire tankfarm and the surroundings. I believe that I suggested 1
>out of every 6-8 tanks in the tankfarm might provide the necessary
>heat. In the case of the East PH that would be about 4 tanks out of
>27, not 1 or 2.

And yet there are no examples of this happening, while I watched the 
TIALD video of an attack on an elderly tankfarm that resolutely failed 
to go up in flames even with two tanks ignited and several more ruptured 
out of fourteen.

The case for a couple of hits wiping out all POL in Hawaii remains 
pretty thoroughly unproven.

>> Much more fuel, more tankers to carry and transfer it, and more
>> destroyers to screen the various units and detached forces - which
cause
>> their own complications, since it's not just "bringing the fuel", it's
>> being able to schedule the RAS programme such that you have time to
>> refuel everybody before the first in the queue runs dry.
>
>Since the Kido Butai was historically able to complete all of their re-
>fueling requirements quite successfully, I see no reason that the
>Combined Fleet could not also make their own arrangements with equal
>success.

Since the Wehrmacht was historically able to assault across rivers, OKH 
saw no reason why the English Channel should not be crossed with equal 
success.

Life's not _quite_ that easy... if it was, everyone would have been 
doing casual UNREP in 1941.

>> This isn't helped by the notorious stability problems of Japanese
>> destroyers, which leaves them dangerously top-heavy well before their
>> fuel gets towards zero, and means they need to RAS pro****tionately much
>> more often: which also opens more gaps in the screen, meaning you need
>> more destroyers, which rapidly turns the operation into the proverbial
>> self-licking lollipop.
>
>The Kido Butai seems to have managed it's destroyer's stability
>problems quite successfully during the historical trips both to and
>from Hawaii. Why wouldn' the same IJN be able to do so for the CF's
>escorting destroyers ?

Because you're bringing many more, to escort a larger and more 
distributed force. It seriously increases the odds of ****ps having 
serious problems when there's a delay in the tanking queue and their 
stability becomes critical.

>>It's made worse by having torpedo attack groups
>> prowling in one sector, battle****ps in another  and the Kido Butai in a
>> third disposed for the set-piece Decisive Battle, since you either need
>> to split your oilers and hope you judged consumption correctly, or else
>> learn to organise a DELBOY schedule very quickly (which needs even more
>> destroyers to escort the oilers, which become absolutely Mission
>> Essential Units)
>
>Why not just leave them behind at a pre-determined rendezvous point as
>the KB did historically with it's two supply groups ?

Because they can't fight a battle off Hawaii if they're well back at a 
predetermined rendezvous. And if they're not along to fight, why bring 
them?

>Why try to re-
>invent the wheel ?

Because you're asking it to fly.

>> Also more ordnance and a way to rearm at sea, since part of your
>> storyline involves fighting the Decisive Battle just off Hawaii - but
>> the carriers need to rearm for that.
>
>Why ? The KB's ordnance lockers were not at all emptied by the
>historical air strikes against PH, with the exception of their newly
>developed 800kg AP bombs made from battle****p shells.

In other words, they're out of one of their key battle****p-killers on 
the day they intend to fight the Decisive Battle and finish off the 
Pacific Fleet's battle line.

*That's* why they need to replenish stocks.

>Lots of
>torpedoes were left over for any US battle****ps that verture
>d to sea
>after being attacked inside of PH.

If torpedoes alone were felt to be sufficient, why bother with 
converting shells into bombs? The IJN felt both were required.

>> And underway repair ****ps, unless vessels damaged in the Decisive
Battle
>> are to be abandoned off Hawaii.
>
>I'm not aware of any "underway repair ****p" designs  that were in IJN
>servise in 1941. Please acquaint me with their names ?

Thanks for making my point for me. This wasn't something the Japanese 
were able to do. Which makes fighting the Decisive Battle so far from 
any sort of repair facility a very high-risk business: damaged ****ps are 
likely to be lost.

>Just as any other navy would expect combat losses, Japan would expect
>to loose a few war****ps in winning the Decisive Battle. War is Hell,
>afterall.

And this guarantees that the tally will be even higher than otherwise. 
War may be hell, but there's no need to _deliberately_ cause yourself 
pain.

>> In other words, the Japanese only need to do in 1941 what it took the
>> USN until 1944 (and nobody else managed it by then, the RN was trailing
>> well behind and nobody else tried) to achieve in the field of underway
>> logistics and sustaining a fleet well beyond its bases. Out for a
>> one-day raid and back is doable: out with enough force for the Pearl
>> Harbor raid and _then_ the Decisive Battle, not just hitting and
running
>> but then staying on station long enough to fight and win a battle, then
>> get back nursing any damaged units; that is a very large step that took
>> a great deal of climbing.
>
>I really don't see why you think so. After the historical PH air raids
>do you see the mangled US Pacific Fleet putting up much of a fight in
>the Decisive Battle ? I don't even see them getting out of ****t, let
>alone being able to fight effectively.

Which makes hauling the entire IJN along to Hawaii and back a completely 
wasted effort, burning irreplaceable fuel oil to no useful purpose.

>And if they don't come out of
>PH on the afternoon of Dec.7'41 then the CF could go close in that
>night to bombard them at dawn on the morning of Dec.8'41. Along with
>another KB air strike of course.

This is a hit-and-run raid, remember? That's why they aren't meant to 
have any logistic troubles?

Stay and fight, and your problems escalate. Trivial difficulties can 
quickly become momentous when you're that far from any friendly 
facilities.

>Why do you feel that the KB and CF would "hang around" Hawaii for
>weeks while awaiting the arrival of more US submarines and further
>reinforcements from the West Coast and the Atlantic ? Such would be a
>foolish move so far from forward bases.

Downright suicidal, in fact. But that seems to be your plan, unless the 
CF steamed to Hawaii in order to promptly turn around and steam home...






-- 
The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its
warriors, will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done
by fools.
                                                            -Thucydides


paul<dot>j<dot>adam[at]googlemail{dot}.com