Re: What IF: ... Japan had more Oilers for Dec.7'41 ?

On Aug 28, 3:21=A0pm, Paul J. Adam wrote:

> >Based on the history of the 1st & 2nd strikes, I'm sure that some of
> >Oahu's firefighters would be straffed, while the tankfarm bombing was
> >going on, by AH 3rd wave Zeros.
>
> The firefighters aren't at the tankfarms until they're on fire, unless
> you imagine them standing around in parade order waiting to be
> machine-gunned. It'll take time to call them in, time for them to
> arrive... in which time the raid is over and gone.

I really don't know how long it would take to bomb all 68 fuel storage
tanks but since a serious attempt would be made to hit each one I
would imagine that the attack would not be instantaneous, all at
once ... hence, an ongoing, continuous attack, by definition.

> So we can ignore the "continuing attack" as a red herring?

 You can call it a "blue snapper" for all that I care at this point in
time.

> And yet there are no examples of this happening, while I watched the
> TIALD video of an attack on an elderly tankfarm that resolutely failed
> to go up in flames even with two tanks ignited and several more ruptured
> out of fourteen.
>
> The case for a couple of hits wiping out all POL in Hawaii remains
> pretty thoroughly unproven.

Thank God.

> >Since the Kido Butai was historically able to complete all of their re-
> >fueling requirements quite successfully, I see no reason that the
> >Combined Fleet could not also make their own arrangements with equal
> >success.
>
> Since the Wehrmacht was historically able to assault across rivers, OKH
> saw no reason why the English Channel should not be crossed with equal
> success.

But the English channel is much wider than any typical European river.
In the case of "my" CF, it will travl the exact same route as the KB
did historically to attack PH. Once again you attempt to compare
apples to oranges, without success.

>>> which rapidly turns the operation into the proverbial
> >> self-licking lollipop.

Say what ?

> >The Kido Butai seems to have managed it's destroyer's stability
> >problems quite successfully during the historical trips both to and
> >from Hawaii. Why wouldn' the same IJN be able to do so for the CF's
> >escorting destroyers ?
>
> Because you're bringing many more, to escort a larger and more
> distributed force. It seriously increases the odds of ****ps having
> serious problems when there's a delay in the tanking queue and their
> stability becomes critical.

Actually not that much bigger a group at at all. One of my earlier
postings detailed the ****tion of the Combined Fleet that sortied to
the Bonin Islands on Dec.7'41 as that which I would bring to Oahu in
sup****t of the KB's strikes. That was:

BBs Nagato, Mutsu, Ise, Fuso, Yama****ro, Hyuga and Hei, Kiri****ma
already sailing with the KB
CV(L) HOSHO
CLs  Oi and Kitikami
DDs eight

Approximately 6 additional auxilliary fleet oilers (faster civilian
conversions) and two more destroyers to escort them

25 more vessels, in total.

> >Why not just leave them behind at a pre-determined rendezvous point as
> >the KB did historically with it's two supply groups ?
>
> Because they can't fight a battle off Hawaii if they're well back at a
> predetermined rendezvous. And if they're not along to fight, why bring
> them?

You want fleet oilers in the Japanese battleline for the Decisive
Battle ??

> >> Also more ordnance and a way to rearm at sea, since part of your
> >> storyline involves fighting the Decisive Battle just off Hawaii - but
> >> the carriers need to rearm for that.
>
> >Why ? The KB's ordnance lockers were not at all emptied by the
> >historical air strikes against PH, with the exception of their newly
> >developed 800kg AP bombs made from battle****p shells.
>
> In other words, they're out of one of their key battle****p-killers on
> the day they intend to fight the Decisive Battle and finish off the
> Pacific Fleet's battle line.
>
> *That's* why they need to replenish stocks.
>
> >Lots of
> >torpedoes were left over for any US battle****ps that verture
> >d to sea
> >after being attacked inside of PH.
>
> If torpedoes alone were felt to be sufficient, why bother with
> converting shells into bombs? The IJN felt both were required.

But only for the PH air attacks because some of the US battle****ps
were tied up inboard of others and thus screened by their sisters from
air dropped torpedoes. On the open sea this would not be the case at
all so torpedoes could be used.

> >I'm not aware of any "underway repair ****p" designs =A0that were in IJN
> >servise in 1941. Please acquaint me with their names ?
>
> Thanks for making my point for me. This wasn't something the Japanese
> were able to do.

AFAIK no other navy was able to do it either. Underway repaair ****ps ?
Please, some nationalities and ****p names.

Which makes fighting the Decisive Battle so far from
> any sort of repair facility a very high-risk business: damaged ****ps are
> likely to be lost.

Just as any other navy would expect combat losses, Japan would expect
to loose a few war****ps in winning the Decisive Battle. War is Hell,
afterall.

> >I really don't see why you think so. After the historical PH air raids
> >do you see the mangled US Pacific Fleet putting up much of a fight in
> >the Decisive Battle ? I don't even see them getting out of ****t, let
> >alone being able to fight effectively.
>
> Which makes hauling the entire IJN along to Hawaii and back a completely
> wasted effort, burning irreplaceable fuel oil to no useful purpose.

The problem with your PoV being that before the KB's air raids are
successful on Dec.7'41 the Japanese have no way of knowing just how
successful that they will actually be. The CF is going along as an
insurance policy.

> >And if they don't come out of
> >PH on the afternoon of Dec.7'41 then the CF could go close in that
> >night to bombard them at dawn on the morning of Dec.8'41. Along with
> >another KB air strike of course.
>
> This is a hit-and-run raid, remember? That's why they aren't meant to
> have any logistic troubles?

I don't see the fuel situation as being that tight that one extra day
would matter at all.

> Stay and fight, and your problems escalate. Trivial difficulties can
> quickly become momentous when you're that far from any friendly
> facilities.

You are as paranoid about war****p losses ad Nagumo was historically.
There ARE going to be losses eventually. Get used to the idea.

> >Why do you feel that the KB and CF would "hang around" Hawaii for
> >weeks while awaiting the arrival of more US submarines and further
> >reinforcements from the West Coast and the Atlantic ? Such would be a
> >foolish move so far from forward bases.
>
> Downright suicidal, in fact. But that seems to be your plan,

Yet again, your words not mine. I tire of this habit of yours.

>unless the
> CF steamed to Hawaii in order to promptly turn around and steam home...

Delaying for one day is not the same as steaming around for several
weeks, at all.